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Abstract 
The priority principle of EU law in relation to the internal law of the Member States, a 
principle enshrined by the Court of Justice case-law and the principle of direct effect allow the 
national court to give full effect to EU law. Breaching the EU law by Member States draws under 
certain conditions their responsibilty for the breach thereof. Unlike public international law, the 
constitutive treaties do not contain provisions relating to liability of Member States for breach of EU 
law. As in other cases, the Court was the one that, over time, has defined a right of redress, which 
has its foundation in EU law and in the conditions necessary to engage the victims' right to repair. 
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1. Introduction     
The  priority principle of EU law in relation to national law of Member States, 
jurisprudentially enshrined by the Court of Justice, and the principle of direct effect allow the 
national court to provide absolute effect to EU law. The non-compliance with EU law, by Member 
States, draws, under certain conditions, the states’ liability for its breach. 
Unlike public international law, the constituent Treaties do not contain provisions relating to 
the liability of Member States for breaching EU law.   
As in other cases, the Court of Justice is the one that, over time, has defined a reparatory law, 
which is grounded on EU law and on the necessary conditions in order for the right to compensation 
to be committed, in the victims’ benefit. Thus, the Court has supplemented this protection of 
litigants’ rights, by enshrining the principle of state liability for breaching EU law. This principle 
applies when a Member State fails to transpose or when it incorrectly transposes an EU rule, but also 
for the breach of EU rules, with or without direct effect.  
Next, we shall highlight the main moments in the consecration, by judicial way, of the 
principle of states obligation to make good damage caused to individuals, by breaches of EU law. 
2. Francovich Judgement
1  
The Court of Justice enshrined for the first time, the principle of Member States liability for 
the breach of EU law in Francovich
2 Judgement, from 1991.  
                                                            
∗ Senior Lecturer, Ph.D., Faculty of Law, “Nicolae Titulescu” University, Bucharest, Romania (e-mail: 
rmpopescu@yahoo.com). 
1 ECJ Judgement of 19 November 1991, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy, C-6/90. 42  Lex ET Scientia. Juridical Series 
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By the Ordinance of July 9, 1989, registered at the Court on January 8, 1990, the national 
Court
3, under article 234
4 TEC, filed an application for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of 
the third paragraph of Article 249
5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and on 
Council Directive no. 80/987 on the harmonization of Member States laws on the protection of 
employees in case of insolvency of their employer. Thus, the national Court asked the Luxembourg 
Court if the Italian Government’s liability for failing to transpose a directive, which had caused 
damage to an Italian citizen, could be committed, on the one hand, and if the individual could require 
an indemnity
6, from the Member State which had not fulfilled its obligation to transpose the 
directive, on the other hand.   
Regarding the first question, the Court established that the directive had no direct effect
7, 
therefore people injured in their right, could not invoke before the competent national Court, the 
Directive provisions against the State. 
We consider that the point of view of the Luxembourg Court is interesting for our study, more 
exactly the point of view regarding the second question of the Italian Court, namely the existence and 
extent of state liability for damages caused by the infringement of obligations arising from EU law. 
In its decision, the Court referred to the following aspects: the principle of extra contractual liability 
of a state; the conditions under which state liability can be committed, the principle of the obligation 
to compensate and state liability limits. 
 
2.1. The consecration of the principle of extra contractual liability of Member States   
We notice, to a careful analysis of the Court’s Judgement that the Luxembourg Court starts in 
its motivation, primarily from highlighting the major principles developed by judicial interpretation. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
2 Circumstances of the case: Andrea Francovich, part in the main proceedings in Case 6 / 90, was employed to 
the CDN Elettronica SnC enterprise in Vicenza. From his position, he had received only occasional payments, in 
advance, of the amounts which were rightfully his, as wages. Consequently, Francovich brought an action before the 
competent Italian Court, which condemned the accused company to pay a sum of approximately 6 million Italian liras. 
During the execution phase of the decision, the executor of the Court issued a report finding the debtor’s insolvency. 
Under those circumstances, Andrea Francovich invoked his right to obtain, from the Italian State, the guarantees 
provided in Directive 80/987 or, alternatively, damages-interests. The Directive invoked has to provide employees a 
minimum of protection at Community level, in case of insolvency of the employer, subject to more favourable national 
provisions, regulating, in particular, specific guarantees for payment of wages. The Directive had to be transposed into 
national law of Member States, no later than October 23, 1983. By the Judgement of February 2, 1989, the ECJ found 
that Italy had not fulfilled its obligation to transpose the Directive. For details, see Sergiu Deleanu, Gyula Fabian, 
Cosmin Flavius Costas, Bogdan Ionita,  “Curtea de Justiţie Europeană. Hotărâri comentate”, (Editura Wolters 
Kluwer, Bucureşti, 2007), p. 233. 
3 Pretura di Vicenza, Italy. 
4 The current art. 258 TFEU. 
5 The current art. 288 TFEU. 
6 Emphasis added. 
7 In its argumentation, the Court recalled that the provisions of a Directive may have direct effect only if they 
are unconditional and sufficiently precise. In this case, the examination of the accomplishment of those criteria was 
made by determining the beneficiaries and content of the guarantee, as well as the identity of the guarantee debtor. In 
terms of beneficiaries and content of the guarantee, the Court held that they were sufficiently precise and unconditional. 
However, regarding the identity of the debtor, the conditions are not achieved, as long as Member States may finance 
the public funds of the guarantee with exclusively public means, but also they may resort to the employers’ 
contributions. As a result, the Court stated: although the directive provisions are sufficiently precise and unconditional, 
as for the determination of the beneficiaries of the guarantee, its content does not offer sufficient evidence for 
individuals to be able to invoke the provisions of a directive before national Courts. In this respect, on the one hand, 
these provisions do not specify the identity of the guarantee debtor and, on the other hand, the state can not be 
considered debtor for the sole reason that it has not taken the necessary measures to transpose the directive within the 
prescribed period.  Roxana-Mariana Popescu  43 
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Thus, the Court reiterates that the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community creates its 
own legal order, integrated in the legal systems of Member States, which is imposed not only to 
them, but also to nationals of Member States
8. The Court recalls that national Courts are obliged to 
apply EU law, to ensure the full effectiveness of EU rules and to protect the rights that EU law 
confers on individuals
9; next, the Court indicates that the effectiveness of Union rules, as well as the 
protection of rights would be jeopardized if the possibility of obtaining compensation was not 
recognized to individuals, in the case where their rights from EU law were violated, breach 
attributable to the state
10. Moreover, the Court states that the principle of state liability for damage 
caused to individuals, as result of the infringement of Community law, is inherent in the system of 
the Treaty
11, and the obligation of Member States to make good such damage is grounded on article 
5
12 of the Treaty
13.  
In paragraph 37 of the Judgement, it is clearly stated that Community law imposes the 
principle under which Member States are compelled to repair the damage caused to individuals, by 
the breach of Community law, attributable to them.    
After analyzing the Union Court’s reply, we can say that the ground for state liability in this 
case, is found both in provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, as well as in 
the Court’s previous case-law that covers the relation between EU law and national law of Member 
States, in general and the direct application (together with the direct effect), as well as the 
application, as a priority, of EU law before national law. 
Thus, the principle of state liability was consecrated. This principle is specific to EU law and 
represents “a right to compensation in the benefit of individuals, allowing, as outlined in the doctrine, 
the material and financial concretization of Community rule”
14. 
 
2.2. The conditions under which state liability may be committed   
Point b) of the Judgement intends to identify the conditions under which states can be held 
liable. According to the Court, while the state liability for damages caused to individuals by 
infringements of EU law, for which it is responsible, has its legal basis in the EU law itself, the 
conditions under which a right to compensation arises, depend on the nature of the EU law breach 
                                                            
8 According to paragraph 31 of the decision: “We recall that the Treaty establishing the EEC has created its 
own legal system, integrated into the legal systems of Member States and which is imposed to their judicial organs, that 
the subjects of this legal system are not only the Member States, but also their nationals and that, as the Community law 
creates obligations for individuals, in the same manner the Community law can also create rights included in their legal 
heritage; these rights arise not only when they are specifically mentioned in the Treaty, but also under obligations that 
the Treaty imposes both to individuals, as well as to Member States and Community institutions”. 
9 In this regard: paragraph 32 of the decision, according to which it should be remembered that, under the 
constant case-law of the Court, the national judicial bodies are responsible with the application of Community 
provisions, with ensuring the absolute effectiveness of these rules and with the protection of rights that they confer on 
individuals.  
10 Paragraph 33: It should be recognized the fact that the very effectiveness of Community rules would be 
jeopardized and that the protection of rights that they enshrine would be diminished, if individuals were not able to 
obtain compensation when their rights were breached by failure to comply with Community law, attributable to the 
State. 
11 Paragraph 35 of the Judgement. 
12 The current art. 4 TFEU. According to this article, Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure 
the fulfilment of incumbent obligations, under EU legal rules. 
13 Paragraph 36. 
14 Roxana Munteanu, “Rolul jurisdicţiilor naţionale în aplicarea principiului răspunderii statului pentru 
daunele cauzate particularilor prin încălcarea dreptului comunitar”, in Dreptul comunitar şi dreptul intern. Aspecte 
privind legislaţia şi practica judiciară, (Editura Hamangiu, Bucureşti, 2008), p. 63. 44  Lex ET Scientia. Juridical Series 
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which is at the origin of the damage caused
15. In this case, when a Member State ignores its 
obligation under the Treaty, to take all measures necessary in order to achieve the result required by a 
EU rule, the full effectiveness of that rule requires the granting of a right to compensation, if three 
conditions
16 are met, namely: 
- the directive must create rights in the individuals’ patrimony;    
- the content of these rights must result from the directive provisions;  
- the existence of a causal link between the infringement of any obligation, by the state and 
the damage caused to the person injured. 
The Court considers that these three conditions are sufficient to give rise, in the individuals’ 
benefit, to a right to receive compensation, right that is directly grounded on Community law
17. 
The Judgement covers naturally, only those conditions under which the state is liable before 
individuals, for failure to implement or for incorrectly implement a directive. Thus, in Francovich 
Case, the Court’s Judgement does not provide answers, but questions such as: may the state liability 
be committed in cases other than those when the state breaches obligations relating to the 
transposition of directives? Is the state liable only if it breaches a Union rule which has direct effect, 
or may its liability be committed also in other EU rules? Given that the conditions required are 
fulfilled, is the state liability lawfully committed (without checking other elements, such as: guilt, 
possible causes of removing liability)?  
The Luxembourg Court of Justice answered at some of those questions, developing in time an 
important case-law.  
3. Brasserie du pêcheur
18  
Francovich Judgement has the merit to have grounded the principle of European Union 
Member States obligation to make good damage caused to individuals, by breaches of EU law, but it 
“has also unleashed an avalanche of studies and analysis that whether noticed the attitude of the 
Court of Justice or they strongly contested it”
19. It should also be noted that although the Court gave 
response to concerns about the protection of individuals’ rights, by the proclamation of that principle, 
Francovich Judgement generated a series of new issues referring on the one hand, to the scope of the 
principle, and on the other hand, to the general conditions for committing liability. According to the 
General Attorney, Giuseppe Tesauro, the issue of state liability for infringements of Community law, 
very important both in terms of principles and consequences that a comprehensive and general 
definition of such liability might have for Member States, is complex and certainly has some traps, as 
demonstrated in the rich doctrinal debate developed in this respect, in recent years
20.    
A key decision to ground the principle of Member States obligation to make good for damage 
caused to individuals, by the breach of EU law, was ruled in the Brasserie du Pêcheur Case
 21. In that 
                                                            
15 Paragraph 38 of the decision. 
16 These are clearly shown, in paragraph 40 of the decision. 
17 Paragraph 41. 
18 ECJ Judgement, 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur / Bundesrepublik Deutschland and the Queen / 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame e.a. C-46/93. 
19 Carol Harlow, “Francovich and the problem of the disobedient state”, European Law Journal (1996), p. 
103. 
20 Conclusions presented at the meeting of November 28, 1995. 
21 Circumstances of the case: Brasserie du pêcheur SA, a French brewery based at Schiltigheim (Alsace), was 
forced to discontinue exports of beer to Germany in late 1981 on the grounds that the beer it produced did not comply 
with the “purity” requirement of the Biersteuergesetz (“BStG”). Further controls on retailers, made by the German Roxana-Mariana Popescu  45 
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case, since the Luxembourg Court had already established that the Member State was responsible for 
the infringement of EU law, Brasserie requested German courts to cover the prejudice suffered, 
meaning the profit losses caused by the restrictive provisions of German law. The national court, 
Bundesgerichtshof, ruled that, under the German law for Government’s liability, the state did not 
have to be held liable for the inaction of the state legislative power, especially since it did not contain 
provisions covering the protection of rights of a third party. In this case, estimating that German law 
does not provide any basis for allowing a repair of the damage caused to the applicant, the German 
court sent to the Luxembourg Court a request for a preliminary ruling to determine if the principle of 
state liability for damage caused to individuals, by the breach of EU law, damage attributable to the 
state, as shown in Francovich Judgement, applies also to the litigation brought before that court. 
More specifically, the Court was asked to answer the following questions: 
- does the principle of EU law, according to which Member States are obliged to pay 
compensation for damage suffered by an individual as a result of infringements of Community law 
attributable to the state also apply where such an infringement consists of a failure to adapt a national 
parliamentary statute to the higher-ranking rules of Community law?;   
- may the national legal system provide that any entitlement to compensation is to be subject 
to the same limitations as those applying where a national statute breaches higher-ranking national 
law, for example, for where an ordinary Federal law breaches the Grundgesetz of the Federal 
Republic of Germany?   
- may the national legal system provide that entitlement to compensation is to be conditional 
on fault (intent or negligence), on the part of the organs of the State responsible for the failure to 
adapt the legislation? 
- if the answer to the first question is affirmative and the answer to the second question is 
negative:  
a) may liability to pay compensation, under the national legal system, be limited to the 
reparation of damage done to specific individual legal interests, for example property, or does it 
require full compensation for all financial losses, including lost profits?   
b) does the obligation to pay compensation also require the reparation of the damage already 
incurred before it was held in judgement of the Luxembourg Court of March 12, 1987 (C-178/84) 
that article 10 of the German Biersteuergesetz breached higher-ranking Community law?   
In other words, the Court had to determine if the State had any obligation to make good the 
damage and, if so, under what conditions and for which types of damage, towards individuals who 
had suffered prejudices due to the application of national laws contrary to EU law.  
First, the Court had to determine if it was necessary, in that case, to define the obligation to 
make good damages caused by the application of a national law contrary to rules of the Union, given 
the fact that in Francovich Judgement, the Court had stated that the failure to transpose a directive, 
under certain conditions, was committing the state liability.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
authorities, who contested the compliance of the beer quality with the law, determined the only German importer of 
Brasserie du pêcheur not to renew the distribution contract. By Judgement of 12 March 1983, the Court held that the 
prohibition on marketing beers imported from other Member States, considered inconsistent with BStG, was 
incompatible with Article 30 EC. Brasserie du pêcheur brought an action against the Federal Republic of Germany for 
reparation of the loss suffered by it as a result of that import restriction between 1981 and 1987, seeking damages in the 
sum of DM 1.8 million, representing only a fraction of the loss actually incurred. The action being dismissed by lower 
courts, Brasserie du Pêcheur maintained the same conclusions in the appeal before the Bundesgerichtshof. As the 
infringement mentioned must be considered as an omission of the legislative body, because it did not change BStG in 
accordance with Community law, the Bundesgerichtshof points out that the damage reparation is provided in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, by the German Civil Code provisions – “BGB” and the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). 46  Lex ET Scientia. Juridical Series 
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Secondly, it was necessary to determine if, subject to the reservation of limits identified by the 
Court, the conditions for liability were the proper conditions of each national legal order or if EU law 
required, at least, the sufficient substantive conditions in order for the defaulting Member State to be 
required to make good the damage caused. Also, in terms of causation, it was necessary to assess if, 
by its nature, the infringed Union provision allowed the individual to directly defend his rights in 
order to eliminate the already established illegality regarding the substance.   
Finally, it was necessary to bring into discussion the procedural conditions regulating the 
right to compensation, and the criteria for evaluating the damage dimension. 
What has the Brasserie du Pêcheur Judgement brought new? First, through this decision, the 
Court clarifies the principle of Member States obligation to make good for damage caused to 
individuals, by the breach of EU law and, on the other hand, the extension of the mentioned principle 
scope is found
22. Thus, as for the clarification of the principle, we notice that the Judgement contains 
a list of general conditions to be fulfilled in order for the obligation of the defaulting state to be 
committed, namely: 
- the breached rule of law must confer subjective rights on individuals;   
- the breach must be sufficiently serious; 
- there must be a causal link between the breach of obligation and the damage suffered.  
In addition to this list, we find also the clarification of these conditions and the necessary tools 
for their adequate application. If, as for the first
23 and third condition, things are clear, with no 
difficulty whatsoever in their application, in the case of the second condition, its application (check) 
has encountered some difficulties. Why? Because we believe that it is quite difficult to give an 
objective answer on the following two questions: “what is a sufficiently serious breach”? and where 
begins the limit when the breach becomes sufficiently serious? This time too, the Court attempts and 
for the moment also manages to present a series of tools, which could be used to provide an accurate 
assessment of the gravity of EU law infringement, by the respective Member State. In this respect, 
according to the Court, the concrete analysis of each case must take into account the following 
factors
24:  
- the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed;  
- the extent of discretion that the rule infringed leaves to the national authorities; 
- the intentional or culpable character of the rule infringed; 
- the excusable or inexcusable character of any possible error of law;  
- the extent to which the Community institutions attitude contributed to the infringement by 
the Member State. 
And yet, what is a breach of EU law, given the tools provided by the Court? For example, a 
breach of EU law is manifest, meaning serious enough, if the state persists to infringe EU law, 
although there is a decision establishing this fact or a constant case-law of the Court, which 
establishes that the respective conduct represents a breach of EU law. 
With regard to the extent of the principle scope, it follows from the content of the decision 
that the principle is applicable, regardless of the state body that has breached EU law. 
                                                            
22 Paul Craig, Gráinne de Burca,“EU Law. Texts and Cases” (Oxford University Press, London, 2003), 
p. 330. 
23 What is, however, “to create subjective rights in the individuals’ patrimony?” How can it be checked, in 
practice, if a rule meets this condition? In the Brasserie du pêcheur case, the Court of Justice did not provide any 
definition, but only noted that in that case, the condition was fulfilled. 
24 Paragraph 56 of Brasserie du pêcheur Judgement, cited above. Roxana-Mariana Popescu  47 
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Compared with Francovich Judgement, where the breach of EU law was represented by the 
failure to transpose a directive, in the Brasserie du pêcheur case, there was an infringement resulting 
from the fact that the national law was contrary to EU law.    
4. Köbler
25 
Although the Brasserie du pêcheur Judgement brought additions and clarifications in the 
matter of EU Member States liability for breaching EU law, another aspect remained, however, 
unanswered, namely: does the Member States liability for acts of the judicial authorities represent 
grounds for committing liability? This issue appears because, from the content of the Brasserie 
Judgement, one can infer (interpret) that the principle is also applicable in the situation where the EU 
infringement is committed by a national Court. However, this interpretation does not result explicitly 
from the ruling of the Court. Thus, seven years after the ruling in Brasserie du pêcheur case, this 
aspect was also clarified in the decision to Köbler case
26.  
In this case, Köbler sued the Austrian state for compensation, showing that the Austrian 
Administrative Court had infringed EU law, causing him damage by not paying the proper addition 
based on seniority. The Austrian state defended itself arguing that the Administrative Court decision 
had not breached EU law, since the purpose of such bonus was the reward of employees’ loyalty who 
had been working at least 15 years continuously, serving the same employer, meaning the Austrian 
state
27.  
However, Austria’s representatives argued that the state obligation to offer compensations 
could not be grounded on an ultimate ruling (as it was the Austrian Administrative Court ruling). In 
this dispute, the Court that had to rule on Mr. Köbler’s claims, considered necessary to receive 
further clarification of the Luxembourg Court, in order to solve the case, which is why it addressed 
several questions to the Luxembourg Court of Justice
28, of which, relevant to our analysis, is the 
next: “does the Court case-law according to which the State liability is committed in case of 
Community law infringement, regardless of the Member State body which is being held liable for 
this breach (especially Brasserie du Pêcheur joined decisions) apply also if the alleged behaviour of 
the body, contrary to Community law stems from a decision of the Supreme Court of a Member 
State, in this case of Verwaltungsgerichtshof?”
29 
                                                            
25 ECJ Judgement of 30 September 2003, Gerhard Köbler c. / Republik Österreich, C-224/01. 
26 Circumstances of the case: Professor Gerhard Köbler had worked at various universities in Germany and 
Austria. In 1996, he requested the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) to compel the employer to grant him 
an age addition, addition provided in Austrian law and taken into account when calculating the pension. Köbler showed 
that even though he had not worked 15 years at an Austrian university, he was meeting that condition of length of 
service, taking into account the years when he had been professor at other universities in Member States of the 
Community. He had demonstrated that it was meeting that condition of service, taking into account the years of activity 
from other universities in the Community. Mr. Köbler also claimed that disregarding the period in which he had been 
professor at other universities in the Community, constituted indirect discrimination contrary to Article 39 of the Treaty 
and Council Regulation no. 1612/68 on the free movement of workers within the Community. The Austrian 
Administrative Court, by the closure of 22 October 1997, required a preliminary ruling asking the ECJ if Article 48 
TEC could be interpreted in the next situation: if when calculating the length of service, the seniority obtained in other 
European countries should be also included.  
27 According to paragraph 11 of Köbler Judgement.  
28 Sergiu Deleanu, etc., op. cit., p.367-368. 
29 Laura Ana-Maria Vrabie (coordinator), “Jurisprudenţa istorică a instanţelor comunitare - culegere de 
hotărâri integrale”, vol.2, European Institute of Romania, Translation Coordination Department, Bucharest, 2008, 
p. 450. 48  Lex ET Scientia. Juridical Series 
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The Luxembourg Court gave to this question, a very clear answer, namely: the principle 
according to which Member States are obliged to make good damage caused to individuals, by 
infringements of Community law for which they are responsible is also applicable when the alleged 
infringement stems from a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance. That principle, inherent in 
the system of the Treaty, applies to any case in which a Member State breaches Community law, 
whichever is the authority of the Member State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach. 
It is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the court competent to adjudicate on 
disputes relating to such reparation. Subject to the reservation that it is for the Member States to 
ensure in each case that those rights are effectively protected, it is not for the Court to become 
involved in resolving questions of jurisdiction to which the classification of certain legal situations 
based on Community law may give rise in the national judicial system”
30. 
In other words, the Court held that, given the “specificity of the judicial service” and the 
legitimate requirements of security in legal relations, the State liability for damage caused to 
individuals, by infringements of EU law in cases where the infringement resulted from a Court 
decision, was governed by the same conditions as any other infringement of EU law, by the state. 
Thus, the ruling “puts the judicial grounds for the developing of the law of Member States liability 
for infringements of Community law”
31, started by Francovich ECJ Judgement. 
Köbler Judgement too represents only a stage in the evolution of the principle of Member 
States liability for damage caused to individuals, by infringements of EU law.   
5. Traghetti del Mediterranea
32    
Three years after the ruling in Köbler case, on June 13, 2006, the European Court of Justice 
issued a new decision, which has the merit of having cleared conditions under which a Member State 
is liable for damage caused to individuals by infringements of EU law, as a result of decisions of 
national Courts adjudicating at last instance.   
In the Traghetti del Mediterraneo
33case, the Geneva Courthouse asked the Luxembourg Court 
to answer the following questions: does EU law, in particular principles set out by the Court in 
Köbler case, oppose to a national regulation, in this case the Italian law, which on the one hand, 
excludes any Member State responsibility for damage caused to individuals by infringements of EU 
law, by a national Court adjudicating at last instance, the breach resulting from the misinterpretation 
                                                            
30 Ibidem, p. 443-444. 
31  Camelia Toader,  “Curtea de Justiţie a Comunităţilor Europene. Hotărârea Curţii din 30 septembrie 
2003”, Analele Universităţii din Bucureşti, Seria Drept, no. IV/2004, (Editura All Beck, Bucureşti, p. 129. 
32 ECJ Judgement, 13 June 2006, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. / Repubblica Italiana, C-173/03. 
33 Circumstances of the case: in 1981, the shipping company Traghetti del Mediterraneo (“TDM”) sued a rival 
company,  Tirrenia di Navigazione. TDM wanted to obtain compensation for damage caused by the competitors 
because of practicing a low tariff policy on routes between Italy and Sardinia, respectively, Sicily, policy made possible 
by benefiting of public subsidies. TDM claimed that the granting of such public subsidies was an act of unfair 
competition, being prohibited by the Treaty establishing the European Community. TDM’s action was dismissed, in 
turn, both at first instance, as well as on appeal and recourse. Considering that the judgement of the Court of Appeal 
was based on an incorrect interpretation of the provisions of Community law, TDM, company that, meanwhile, went 
into liquidation, sued the Italian state, before the Genoa Court. TDM requested the Court, the reparation of damages 
that the company had suffered because of the misinterpretation of the Court of Appeal. TDM also wanted to be 
demonstrated that the mentioned Court had infringed the Community law, by not complying with its obligation of 
asking ECJ for a preliminary ruling. Roxana-Mariana Popescu  49 
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of EU law or from the incorrect assessment of facts or evidence and, on the other hand, is this kind of 
liability limited only to cases of intent or serious negligence of the Court.  
Starting from the idea according to which excluding the possibility that the State 
responsibility would be committed when the EU law infringement resulted from the interpretation of 
a Union provision or incorrect assessment of facts or evidence, would prejudice the effectiveness of 
the liability established by Köbler decision, the Court answered both questions, as it follows
34:  
- Community law makes inapplicable the national legislation which excludes State liability, in 
general, for any damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law, caused by a 
Court of last instance, when the breach is the result of a misinterpretation of a Community rule or an 
incorrect assessment of facts and evidence; 
- Community law makes inapplicable the national legislation which limits such liability solely 
to cases of intentional fault or serious negligence by the Court, if such a restriction leads to the 
removal of state liability in other cases where a manifest breach of the applicable rule was 
committed. 
6. Kapferer
35 
Remaining loyal to the principle of Member States responsibility for damage caused to 
individuals by infringements of EU law, the Luxembourg Court of Justice adjudicates again, in 2006, 
and the decision is part of the post-Köbler evolution of the principle mentioned.   
In this respect, we bring to the forefront of attention the Kapferer
36 Judgement. In this case, 
the Court of Appeal (Landesgericht Innsbruck) filed a request for preliminary ruling. One of the 
questions was related to the fact if the national Court had, and if so, under what conditions, the 
obligation to reopen a case and to invalidate a final and irrevocable decision contrary to EU law 
regarding the international case-law.  
Starting from the idea that the principle of res judicata is recognized both in the legal systems 
of EU Member States and in the European Union, the Court stated that, in order to ensure the 
stability of legal relations and the proper administration of justice, it was important that Court 
decisions which would become final after having exhausted all appeals or after the expiry of their 
exercise periods, could not be brought again in discussion
37. 
                                                            
34  Communiqué de presse n° 49/06, 13 June 2006 (http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/ 
pdf/2009-02/cp060049fr.pdf)  
35 ECJ Judgement, on 16 March 2006, Rosmarie Kapferer v. / Schlank & Schick GmbH, C-234/04. 
36 Circumstances of the case: as a consumer, residing in Tirol (Austria), Ms. Kapferer received from Schlank & 
Schick company (company established in Germany), a promotional material by which she was announced that she 
could win a prize of 3906,1 €. Receiving the award was subject to an order-test without, however, involving any 
commitment. Ms. Kapferer sent the order form to Schlank & Schick, but it was not possible to determine whether, in 
fact, she had ordered something on that occasion. By not having received the prize she thought she had won, Ms 
Kapferer brought an action against Schlank & Schick, before Bezirksgericht Hall in Tirol (the Austrian Court), seeking 
payment of € 3906.1, plus interest. Schlank & Schick claimed, under Regulation no. 44/2001 on case-law, recognition 
and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, that the Austrian Court had no jurisdiction, as defined 
in the Regulation, to hear the case. Bezirksgericht Hall in Tirol dismissed the application. Under those circumstances, 
Ms. Kapferer brought the case before the Landesgericht Innsbruck. Schlank & Schick did not appeal the first instance 
judgement, so in that respect, the judgement was final. 
37  Communiqué de presse n° 423/06, 13 march 2006 (http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/ 
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Thus, according to the Court, the answer to the question formulated by the Court of Appeal is 
negative, meaning that the principle of cooperation, provided by article 4 TFEU does not compel a 
national Court not to apply its own rules of procedure, in order to review and repeal a final and 
irrevocable decision contrary to Community law
38.  
7. Conclusions 
The principle of obligation of Member States of the European Union to make good the 
damage caused to individuals by infringements of EU law is one of the fundamental principles 
ensuring the full effectiveness of EU law.   
The consecration of this principle is one of the most significant developments of the case-law, 
along with other principles, such as the direct effect and the priority of EU law in relation to national 
law.  
 Without the recognition of this principle, the direct effect of EU law would have probably 
been only partially effective for the exploitation of the legal rights conferred on individuals, by EU 
rules.  
It should be noted that the affirmation of the principle of states responsibility for damage 
caused to individuals was evolutionary, if we consider the extension scope, starting from acts of the 
executive to all State authorities, whichever is their function, using, however, the same argument and 
logical line from Francovich Judgement and from other judgements fundamental for the shaping of 
EU law, as autonomous legal order.  
In Brasserie du pêcheur Judgement, the Court held that the principle of state responsibility, 
being inherent in the system of the Treaty, was valid for any breach of EU law, whichever was the 
national body whose act or omission was responsible for the breach
39. By this statement, the Court no 
longer acts only under the EU Treaty system, but also under the mandatory principle of the uniform 
application of Community law and of the useful comparison with state responsibility in international 
law
40. 
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